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Abstract 
 
This paper highlights the most important institutional evolutions of Belgian federalism 
stemming from the implementation of the sixth state reform (2012-2014). This reform inter 
alia included a transfer of powers worth 20 billion euros from the federal level to the level 
of the federated states, a profound reform of the Senate, and a substantial increase in fiscal 
autonomy for the regions. This contribution critically analyses the current state of Belgian 
federalism. Although the sixth state reform realized important and long-awaited changes, 
further evolutions are to be expected. Since the Belgian state model has reached its limits 
with regard to complexity and creativity, politicians and academics should begin to reflect 
on the seventh state reform with the aim of increasing the transparency of the current 
Belgian institutional labyrinth. 
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1. Introduction 
 
After the federal elections of 2010, Belgian politicians negotiated for 541 days in order 
to form the government of Prime Minister Di Rupo, which took the oath on 6 December 
2011. This resulted in the (unofficial) world record of longest government formation 
period. After the Flemish liberal party (Open VLD) elicited the end of the government of 
Prime Minister Leterme, Belgian citizens had to vote on 13 June 2010. The right-wing 
nationalist party (N-VA) convincingly won the elections in Dutch-speaking Flanders, while 
the Socialist party (PS) acquired the most votes in French-speaking Wallonia. Negotiations 
of nearly a year and a half finally resulted into the so-called Butterfly Agreement on the sixth 
state reform of 11 October 2011.I This reform inter alia included a transfer of powers worth 
20 billion euros from the federal level to the level of the federated states (i.e. the regions 
and communities), a profound reform of the Senate, and a substantial increase in fiscal 
autonomy for the regions. The agreement was converted into legislation during the years 
2012 to 2014 and is currently being implemented at the level of the states. Therefore, it is 
time to take a closer look at the current state of Belgian federalism after the sixth state 
reform and to reflect on its future.     
In this regard, the following topics will be analysed: the ‘trick’ with the constitutional 
amendment procedure in article 195 of the Constitution (1.); the historical split of the 
electoral and judicial district Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde (2.); the reform of the Senate (3.); 
the modification of the Special Finance Act, including the substantial increase in fiscal 
autonomy for the regions (4.); the distribution of powers between the federal level, the 
regions and communities (5.); the future of Brussels (6.) and finally the future of Belgian 
federalism (7.). 
 
2. Amendment of  article 195 of  the Constitution 
 
The implementation of the sixth state reform (2012-2014) through several 
constitutional amendments shows that the constitutional amendment procedure is at odds 
with the current Belgian federal cooperation model (Popelier 2012: 442). In order to 
implement the Butterfly Agreement on the sixth state reform, Parliament temporarily altered 
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the constitutional amendment procedure itself in article 195 of the Constitution by adding 
a divergent ‘transitional provision’ to the amendment procedure, which provoked 
substantial criticism.  
Article 195 of the Constitution prescribes the constitutional amendment procedure, 
which contains three phases. Firstly, Parliament (i.e. the Chamber of Representatives and 
the Senate) and the King each adopt a list of constitutional provisions which are ‘declared 
to be revisable’. After approval of this list the dissolution of Parliament automatically 
follows, with the organisation of new elections within 40 days. Afterwards, the newly 
elected Parliament has the power to (only) amend those constitutional provisions which 
were declared to be susceptible to revision by Parliament and the King in their joint list. In 
order to amend the constitution, two thirds of the members of each Chamber of 
Parliament are required to be present, and two thirds of the members present must 
approve the amendment.  
The procedure of article 195 dates back to the first Belgian constitution of 1831. At 
that time, there were legitimate reasons for its rigidity; it was the main aim of article 195 to 
avoid the possibility that an accidental majority could substantially amend the constitution 
without prior consultation of the voters.  
In 2011, the list of constitutional provisions which were designated to be susceptible to 
revision did not contain all articles required for the implementation of the agreement on 
the sixth state reform. However, after a regime crisis of 541 days politicians wanted to 
avoid the organization of new elections. As a result, the negotiators of the sixth state 
reform used their legal toolbox in order to implement the entire agreement without the 
approval of a new revision statement and without new elections. The list included article 
195 of the Constitution, namely the constitutional amendment procedure itself. 
Consequently, the negotiators decided to add a ‘transitional provision’ to article 195, which 
was only valid during the same legislative term and gave authority to immediately revise the 
necessary constitutional provisions. From a strictly legal perspective, one could argue that a 
two-thirds majority was permitted to amend article 195 in this way, even though the 
constitutional amendment procedure and its guarantees were in practice temporarily set 
aside. 
The transitional provision contained an exhaustive list of constitutional provisions 
susceptible to immediate revision. An amendment could only be adopted with a two-thirds 
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majority as required by article 195 and was not seen as a revision statement leading to 
dissolution of Parliament.  
 
2.1. Guarantees of article 195 
It has already been argued on a regular basis that the amendment procedure in article 
195 of the Constitution is too rigid (Van Nieuwenhove 2012: 156). Legal scholars have 
questioned whether the aims of this procedure outweigh its adverse effects.  
In theory, the Constituent Assembly aimed to ensure that the voters could express their 
opinion in an election about the constitutional provisions susceptible to revision. In 
practice, however, Parliament uses, or indeed abuses, the approval of a revision statement 
as the standard procedure to rescind parliament and hold new elections. Afterwards, the 
election campaign is often dominated by general policy issues instead of a thorough debate 
about the revision statement.  
It was the intention of article 195 to avoid a rash approval of constitutional 
amendments, as the Constitution guarantees the fundamental basic principles which are 
essential to the rule of law. Consequently, it should not be possible to amend a constitution 
through the regular legislative procedure. A more rigid procedure ought to safeguard the 
fundamental character of the Constitution, which is obviously more than ‘a scrap of paper’.II 
 
2.2. Criticism 
The opposition parties heavily criticized the ‘trick’ with article 195 of the Constitution 
described above, as it dodged the guarantees of the amendment procedure. The Flemish 
right-wing nationalist party (N-VA) inter alia referred to article 187 of the Constitution, 
which forbids a partial or entire suspension of the Constitution. They argued that the 
transitional provision did not regulate the transition from an old to a new arrangement, but 
in fact constituted a temporary suspension of the Constitution (Vandernoot 2013). From 
the beginning of the consecutive legislative term, the ordinary amendment procedure 
would, once more, become the applicable law. Nevertheless, it is remarkable that N-VA 
itself, when the party was still involved in the negotiations, also launched several proposals 
which required the amendment of articles over and above those susceptible to revision. It 
seems highly unlikely that N-VA would have proposed to wait another legislative term 
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rather than take advantage of some constitutional high-tech; the duty of the opposition is, 
of course, to oppose. 
Moreover, N-VA petitioned the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe to 
scrutinize the temporary revision of article 195 of the Constitution.III The Commission 
argued that the amendment procedure ought to safeguard some important guarantees, but 
at the same time stated that in practice these aims have not always been fully accomplished. 
As a result, the Venice Commission refuted the arguments of the opposition regarding the 
guarantees of article 195. Furthermore, the Commission decided that article 195 of the 
Constitution had not been suspended though indeed it had been altered. On 20 June 2012, 
the Venice Commission thus ruled that the ‘transitional provision’ neither violated the 
letter and the spirit of the Constitution nor international norms and standards.IV  
 
2.3. Towards a reform of article 195? 
Although the Venice Commission ruled that the transitional provision was not 
unconstitutional, the ‘trick’ can still be criticised. Indeed, the adoption of the ‘transitional 
provision’ could be used as a precedent, so that in the future only one article, namely article 
195 of the Constitution, might be declared susceptible to amendment. Such an evolution 
would of course blatantly undermine the guarantees provided by article 195.  
The initiation of a debate about a sustainable reform of article 195 is recommendable, 
as the efficacy of the current procedural guarantees is highly questionable. We believe that 
it is time to thoroughly modernise the constitutional amendment procedure, and adapt it to 
the current federal cooperation model, instead of relying on the ‘trick’ with article 195 for 
possible future state reform. Some politicians are reluctant to discuss such reforms, as they 
fear that a simplification of the amendment procedure would make further devolution to 
the regions and communities easier and would thus contribute to the dismantlement of the 
federal level.  
Despite an explicit demand of N-VA, in view of facilitating its institutional reformist 
agenda after the next election, the intention to include article 195 in the revision statement 
at the end of the current legislative term has not been mentioned in the coalition agreement 
of the new government of Prime Minister Michel. Undoubtedly, this important debate will 
be revived at the end of the current legislative session. 
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3. The split of  Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde 
 
The electoral district of Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde (BHV) dates back to 1830, the year in 
which Belgium became independent. Ever since the state reforms after 1970 which gave 
rise to the regions and communities, the electoral district BHV has been a constant source 
of friction in Belgian politics. In 2002, while an amendment of the federal Election Act 
merged the majority of the former electoral constituencies based on communal districts 
into provincial electoral districts, in Flemish-Brabant the existing electoral districts BHV 
and Leuven remained unchanged. The BHV district spanned two regions (and two 
language areas), namely the Flemish Region and the bilingual Brussels-Capital Region. It 
included the 19 municipalities of the bilingual Brussels-Capital Region as well as 35 
municipalities of the province Flemish-Brabant. 
Most of the Flemish parties, however, considered BHV as a mechanism supporting the 
‘Frenchification’ of the Flemish areas adjacent to Brussels. In federal and European 
elections, French-speaking politicians from Brussels could win votes in the 35 Flemish 
municipalities of Flemish-Brabant. The Flemish politicians, in their turn, also benefited 
from the BHV district to get better electoral results in Brussels. Nevertheless, BHV 
became a symbol of the anomalies and antagonisms in Belgian federalism.  
In 2003, the Belgian Constitutional Court ruled that, in view of the new provincial 
electoral districts, maintaining the old communal districts Leuven and BHV constituted an 
unacceptable inequality.V The Court gave the legislature four years to resolve the ‘BHV-
problem’ (Peeters and Mosselmans 2009: 5). Despite the Court’s decision, the BHV case 
dominated Belgian politics for a period far exceeding these four years and resulted in the 
fall of the Leterme-II government in 2010. It was apparent that a compromise on BHV 
had to be reached before a new government could be formed.  
On 14 September 2011, more than eight years after the landmark decision of the 
Constitutional Court, an agreement was reached on the split of the BHV electoral district. 
The agreement was implemented by Chapter 2 of the Act of 19 July 2012 amending the 
federal Election Act. The province of Flemish-Brabant became a separate provincial 
electoral district. The district includes the former communal districts of Halle-Vilvoorde 
and Leuven. In addition, the Brussels-Capital electoral district was created. As a 
compensation for the Flemish demand to split BHV, the Act grants French-speaking 
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citizens ‘special modalities’ in the six suburban municipalities with facilitiesVI surrounding 
Brussels.  
These ‘special modalities’ guarantee a status quo for the acquired rights of the French-
speaking citizens living in these six municipalities. They retain the choice to vote for 
political candidates of the Flemish-Brabant district or for those of Brussels Capital. In 
other words, these voters retain the right to vote for candidates in Brussels, even though 
they are taken into account to calculate the number of parliamentary seats accorded to 
Flemish-Brabant. This special regime is entrenched in article 16bis of the Special Act on 
Institutional Reform. As a result, an alteration of this regime requires in each parliamentary 
Chamber a majority of the votes cast both in the Flemish and the French language group 
as well as an overall two-thirds majority of the votes cast in each Chamber.  
The institutional opposition did not agree with this solution for BHV. Several French-
speaking parties criticised the loss of the right of the inhabitants of the remaining 29 
municipalities of Halle-Vilvoorde to vote for candidates from Brussels. They regarded the 
compensatory measures to be inadequate. On the other side, according to the Flemish 
opposition parties too many concessions were made to obtain the split. The main criticisms 
related to the practical consequences of the split for Flemish-Brussels representation in the 
Chamber of Representatives. A Fleming elected in the district of Brussels Capital would 
become a rarity, as it would in practice only be possible if almost all Flemish parties were to 
come together to constitute one electoral list. This Flemish fear indeed came true in 2014, 
because in the recent federal election only French-speaking politicians were elected in 
Brussels Capital.  
 
3.1. Special dispute settlement in the suburban municipalities of Brussels 
Disputes between the communities, mostly concerning the correct interpretation of the 
Belgian language legislation, regularly arise in the six municipalities with facilities in the 
suburban area of Brussels. Consequently, the sixth state reform provided a legal solution to 
address these problems. From now on, all administrative disputes originating in these six 
municipalities could be settled by the General Assembly of the Council of State (Baeckeland 
and Nelissen 2014: 258; Velaers 2014a: 172). This assembly now also has the final word on 
disputes concerning the appointment of mayors in these six municipalities (Remiche and 
Van den Eynde 2013). The General Assembly has a bilingual French-Dutch composition 
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which seemed advisable for cases concerning delicate language issues. On the other hand, 
the assembly now also has jurisdiction over disputes which are not at all related to tensions 
between the Flemish and French Communities, such as the annulment of a planning 
permission for building a henhouse. This ‘legal overkill’ has rightly been criticised by the 
Flemish institutional opposition.  
In the meantime, the General Assembly of the Council of State has ruled for the first 
time on a dispute about the interpretation of the above-mentioned language facilities.VII On 
the one hand, the Council of State acknowledges the primacy of the Dutch language in the 
six Flemish suburban municipalities. On the other hand, it points out that the 
administrative requirement demanded by the Flemish Government to express one’s 
language preference every single time violates the minority rights of the French-speaking 
citizens. Hence, the Council of State concludes that a request for language facilities only 
has to be renewed every four years.  
 
3.2. Reform of the BHV judicial district 
The agreement on the sixth state reform not only included the split of the BHV 
electoral district and the special regime for the municipalities with facilities, but also 
provided a reform of the BHV judicial district (Gosselin 2013). This judicial district was 
difficult to manage due to its complex structure. The Act of 19 July 2012 on the reform of 
the judicial district of Brussels implemented a thorough reform. The Act split the former 
prosecutor’s office into a prosecutor’s office of Halle-Vilvoorde and a prosecutor’s office 
of Brussels. As a result, the prosecutor’s offices are able to decide on their own policy, 
taking into account the specific criminal activities most frequently occurring in their 
district. However, the courts themselves were not territorially divided. They are duplicated 
based on language; every court is now divided into two monolingual sections. 
Consequently, there is no real split of the BHV judicial district (Vandenbruwaene 2014: 
207; Vanlerberghe 2014: 202). With some minor exceptions, this Act has recently passed 
constitutional review.VIII 
Generally, we can conclude that the negotiations on the split of Brussels-Halle-
Vilvoorde were conducted in a typical Belgian way. In order to reach an agreement on the 
sixth state reform, both Flemings and Walloons made concessions. As BHV afflicted 
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Belgium for almost fifty years and led to an institutional crisis, it is important that an 
agreement has finally been reached.  
 
4. Reform of  the Senate 
 
The Belgian Senate looks completely different after the sixth state reform. A thorough 
reform of the bicameral system has been implemented, whereby the composition and 
legislative powers of the Senate were revised. From now on, the Senate is an assembly 
primarily representing the interests of the federated entities on the federal level, which fills 
a gap in the Belgian federal state structure. It is appropriate in a federal state that the 
federated entities have a say in (federal) matters which concern them (Goossens and 
Cannoot 2013: 6). Representation of the interests of federated entities principally – though 
not always – takes place within a second federal chamber (Popelier 2014: 57). Patricia 
Popelier theoretically distinguishes four sets of powers that can be distributed to the 
second chamber: (1) powers that directly relate to the federal state structure and 
functioning of the federated entities, (2) powers that influence the policy discretion of the 
federated entities, such as concurring powers, (3) powers that indirectly influence the 
discretion of the federated entities and (4) powers that do not relate to the federated 
entities (Popelier 2014: 59). Moreover, it is only if a second chamber is composed of a 
delegation from the Parliaments of the federated entities, that it should be expected to play a 
significant parliamentary role at the federal level (Popelier 2014: 58). After the reform, it is 
now up to the Senate to fulfil its new role as chamber of the federated entities. 
 
4.1. New composition 
The new Senate has become smaller (Fornoville 2014: 28): it now consists of 60 
senators instead of 71. There are no longer directly elected senators; in the new Senate, 50 
out of the 60 seats are occupied by senators who are appointed by and from the Parliaments 
of the communities and regions. Among these senators, the distribution of seats is based 
on the electoral results in the communities and regions. Before the sixth state reform, the 
Senate already had 21 so-called ‘community senators’, designated by and from the 
Parliaments of the communities. Although in this way the communities were represented at 
the federal level, the seats of the community senators were distributed based on the 
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election results for the federal Senate and there were no representatives of the regions.  
The other ten senators are ‘co-opted senators’. The technique of co-optation was 
initially introduced to involve experts (technocrats) in the parliamentary work of the 
Senate. They were presumed to improve the quality of the debate and the legislation. 
Unfortunately, nowadays this category of senators is primarily used to provide a seat for 
politicians who could not be directly elected. Parliament preserved co-optation in the sixth 
state reform as a compensation for the split of the Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde electoral 
district in order to ensure that (Flemish) Brussels politicians could still become members of 
the Senate. 
Maintaining the technique of co-optation is a stain on the character of the reform 
(Muylle 2014: 114). The distribution of the ten seats is based on the election results of the 
Chamber of Representatives, which is inconsistent with the idea of the Senate as a chamber 
of the federated entities. Given the considerable reduction of legislative powers of the 
Senate, it would have been more rational to have given these co-opted politicians a seat in 
the Chamber instead. Either way, we believe that co-optation should be abolished since 
non-elected technocrats already work in the cabinets and as parliamentary staff members. 
Moreover, if experts want to become a Member of Parliament, they should participate in 
the elections.  
 
4.2. Vast reduction of powers 
The sixth state reform curtailed the powers of the Senate and transformed the 
institution into a non-permanent body which now holds a plenary meeting eight times per 
year. The unicameral procedure, in which the legislative power is vested in the Chamber of 
Representatives and the King without involvement of the Senate, became the standard 
legislative procedure. The unicameral procedure applies to all matters for which the 
optional or full bicameral procedure has not explicitly been prescribed by the Constitution. 
As a compensation, a second reading has been introduced in the Chamber of 
Representatives. As a result, the Senate will have substantially less legislative work.  
The remaining powers of the Senate mainly relate to institutional matters: the revision 
and coordination of the Constitution, the adoption of special majority acts, and ordinary 
acts with an institutional character. The Senate no longer participates in the everyday 
management of the country, but through the Senate the federated entities now have full co-
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decision power and thus potentially veto power regarding institutional matters.  
However, it is doubtful whether the Senate will be able to adequately act as a full-
fledged chamber of the federated entities, since the scope of its powers is very limited. In 
contrast to the German Bundesrat, the Belgian second chamber has limited power to 
regulate matters with a possible impact on the policy of the federated entities, such as the 
federal budget (Popelier 2014: 90; Van der Besien 2014: 132). Without new negotiations 
about a next state reform, the Senate will in practice have almost no substantive work, 
unless it were to proactively take the role of institutional bridge-builder between the 
regions and communities as well as think-tank regarding the institutional future of Belgium 
(Goossens and Cannoot 2013: 7). It should be mentioned that article 42 of the 
Constitution still stipulates that senators represent the entire nation, even though it was the 
intention to transform the Senate into a chamber that represents the federated entities.  
 
4.3. Senate: quo vadis? 
The shortcomings of the Senate reform can be attributed to the absence of a clear 
vision regarding the future, and the appropriate role, of the Senate (Van der Besien 2014). 
For instance, most Flemish political parties preferred the abolition of the institution and 
thus were in favour of the end of bicameralism. Ultimately, the Senate’s role could easily be 
taken over by a special institutional committee within the Chamber of Representatives. 
Moreover, the interests of the communities and regions are already protected by several 
other instruments: the presence of language groups in the Chamber of Representatives, the 
language parity of the federal government, and suspension mechanisms such as the alarm 
bell procedure and the procedure for conflicts of interest (Popelier 2014). On the other 
hand, some people advocate the idea of a more influential Senate with full legislative 
powers for the federated entities at the federal level.  
We believe that a well-functioning Senate could be of great value in a federal state. One 
could opt for a full-fledged chamber of the federated entities, and increase its legislative 
powers to become similar to those of the German Bundesrat. If the current Senate wants to 
uphold its raison d’être, it should become a consultation platform where representatives of 
the federated entities work together on sensitive topics which may lead to disagreements 
between the communities and regions, and it should reflect on possible future steps in the 
evolution of the (con)federal Belgian State.  
 Except  where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   E -   
 
41 
For now, however, Belgium has an institution whose current value and role are not 
clear. It is up to the politicians to make a deliberate choice. They should either abolish the 
Senate and leave its tasks to the Chamber of Representatives, or ensure that the Senate 
actively resolves tensions between the communities and regions and prepares future 
institutional steps. 
 
5. Reform of  the Special Finance Act and fiscal autonomy for the 
regions 
 
The institutional agreement on the sixth state reform announced a substantial reform 
regarding the financing of the federated entities. The Special Finance Act of 6 January 2014 
substantially expanded the fiscal autonomy of the regions. We will now outline the main 
principles of the reform. 
During the process of Belgium’s transformation into a federal state, a complex set of 
rules had been created to finance the powers of the regions and communities. The third 
state reform of 1988 led to the adoption of the Special Finance Act, which determined that 
the financing of the regions and communities mainly stems from allocated parts 
(‘dotations’) of federal personal income tax and value-added tax.  
Although these dotations are allocated parts of federal taxes, to a certain extent 
accountability of the regions and communities still remains (Goossens and Van Belle 2012: 
1191). As the financial resources are limited, the efficiency level results in more or less 
financial resources which can be spent for implementing policies. Nevertheless, the recent 
reform of the Special Finance Act mainly focuses on accountability through fiscal 
autonomy for the regions. Henceforth, politicians of the regions now have to make choices 
and justify how they will generate tax revenue in order to accomplish their policy goals. At 
the time of elections, fiscal autonomy results in democratic accountability. Although the 
notions ‘autonomy’ and ‘accountability’ are quite similar, they ought to be distinguished 
from each other (Goossens and Van Belle 2012: 1191).  
 
5.1. Regional fiscal autonomy 
Regional fiscal autonomy in the sixth state reform is expanded by the power for the 
regions to impose unlimited ‘extensive surcharges’ (a certain percentage on top of the 
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standard tax) in respect of personal income tax. This fiscal autonomy replaces the previous 
dotation from the revenue of personal income tax. In addition, the regions can now also 
impose tax increases or decreases, as well as reductions in federal personal income tax 
concerning matters for which they are competent. The sum of the surcharges, reductions, 
tax increases and decreases is called the ‘regional personal income tax’. Nonetheless, the 
powers transferred to the regions in the sixth state reform are financed with new dotations 
instead of increased fiscal autonomy (Goossens and Van Belle 2014: 1). 
 
5.2. Financing of communal powers 
The powers transferred to the communities in the sixth state reform (e.g. family 
benefits, care for the elderly, and healthcare) are financed by new dotations. In contrast to 
the regions, the communities have not acquired any fiscal autonomy, because this might 
cause problems with regard to the territorial division of powers and the principle of 
equality in Brussels, as both the Flemish and the French Community are competent on the 
territory of Brussels. Giving fiscal autonomy to the communities could lead to the 
establishment of sub-nationalities and an unjustified differential treatment of neighbours in 
Brussels who might be subjected to different tax rules. As a result, the communities still 
mainly receive their income from allocated parts (dotations) of the revenue of federal 
personal income tax and value-added tax.  
 
5.3. New solidarity mechanism 
Before the sixth state reform, the national solidarity compensation could result in so-
called ‘perverse effects’, such as the ‘development trap’. In the latter case a region would 
receive less dotations in spite of increased tax profit due to economic growth in the region. 
The sixth state reform has maintained a national solidarity mechanism, but in a more 
limited way and without perverse effects.  
 
5.4. Temporary transitional mechanism 
As Wallonia would most likely receive less income in the case of increased regional 
fiscal autonomy, a (temporary) transitional mechanism was proposed in order to seal the 
deal during the negotiations on the sixth state reform (Pagano 2013). It was agreed that a 
region or community could neither be structurally impoverished, nor financially gain or 
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lose in the first year that the reform of the Special Finance Act enters into force (Goossens 
and Van Belle 2014: 1). As from budget year 2015, a transitional amount will be provided 
for the communities and regions in order to offset the impact of the reform. This amount 
remains the same in nominal value during the first ten years. During the subsequent ten 
years, it will decrease linearly (with a gradual decrease of 10% per year) until it has 
completely vanished. Hence, Wallonia has been given the time to economically strengthen 
itself and to increase its income tax revenue.  
 
5.5. ‘Proper funding’ of Brussels 
The sixth state reform also provides ‘proper funding’ of the Belgian capital city 
(Yernault 2013). There are several reasons why Brussels needs additional funding. Firstly, 
fiscal autonomy concerning personal income tax as an accountability mechanism is not 
effective for Brussels. The wages of many employees cannot be subjected to taxation in 
Brussels, as many of them are commuters who live in other regions. Secondly, Brussels 
loses significant tax revenue due to the presence of many international and national public 
institutions which enjoy exemption from property taxation. Finally, the status of Brussels 
as capital city and headquarters of numerous international institutions entails additional 
tasks and costs.  
Therefore, the additional funding for Brussels will be 461 million EUR by 2015 
(Goossens and Van Belle 2012: 1205). One part of this funding is allocated to a specific 
purpose, for the additional burdens that Brussels bears in comparison to other regions with 
regard to bilingualism, mobility, training and safety. The other part of the financing is called 
the ‘dead hand’ compensation, and is a compensation for the loss of revenue due to the 
exemption from property tax of numerous buildings. In addition, a structural refinancing is 
provided for commuters (financed by the other two regions) and international officials 
(financed by the federal government). After 2015, the additional ‘proper funding’ of the 
Brussels-Capital Region will be limited to maximum 0.1% of the GDP.  
 
5.6. Climate accountability and contribution to public expenses 
The reform of the Special Finance Act also introduced a climate accountability 
mechanism for the regions and communities. If a region or community exceeds, or fails to 
reach, the targets on greenhouse gas emission reduction as defined by the National Climate 
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Committee, there will respectively be a financial bonus or malus which will be paid or 
received by the federal government (Pas 2014: 360).  
It is mainly the federal government that pays pensions, even of civil servants of the 
communities and regions. Traditionally, the regions and communities contributed to these 
pensions only to a very limited extent based on the Special Act of 5 May 2003. Following 
the sixth state reform, the financial contribution of the regions and communities in respect 
of pensions will progressively increase from 2016 onwards. Moreover, the regions and 
communities will also be required to significantly contribute to the public financing of the 
State (250 million EUR in 2014, 1.25 billion EUR in 2015 and 2.5 billion EUR from 2016) 
and the increasing aging cost of the population (a contribution of 0.23% of GDP by 2030), 
which will have a substantial impact on their budget. 
  
6. Transfer of  powers in the sixth state reform: Copernican revolution? 
 
Since 1970, the Belgian Constitution has mentioned the existence of communities and 
regions. The establishment of these unique federated entities has particular historical 
origins. Flemish politicians wanted to establish communities to acquire cultural autonomy 
and protect their language and culture. Walloon, mainly left-wing, politicians on the other 
hand, pursued economic autonomy via the establishment of regions.  
Over time, the communities have acquired legislative powers concerning so-called 
‘person-related’ matters, such as education, culture and assistance to persons. Economic 
and ‘place-related matters’, such as spatial planning, public works and agriculture, were 
transferred to the regions. Other federal countries, such as Germany, Switzerland and the 
U.S., only have one type of federated state, respectively Länder, cantons and states, based 
on territory alone. Thus, the unique division of the federated level in Belgium into 
communities and regions is remarkable and complex. 
 
6.1. Extensive transfer of powers 
In light of the historical evolution of Belgian federalism, the sixth state reform is 
undoubtedly a major reform. The whole package of power transfers is extensive (ca. 20 
billion euros), especially in comparison with previous state reforms. In addition, for the 
first time powers regarding social security were transferred to the federated entities, as the 
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power concerning family allowances is decentralized from the federal level to the 
communities. In Brussels, however, the latter power is transferred to the ‘Common 
Community Commission’, composed of members of the Brussels-Capital regional 
parliament. Consequently, the Flemish and French Communities are not competent in 
Brussels regarding family allowances. The same evolution, which is a break with the past, 
can be noticed with regard to juvenile criminal law: a transfer of powers to the 
communities, but in Brussels the (regional) Common Community Commission is 
competent (Ludmer 2013, Pas 2014: 346).  
Moreover, the powers of the communities are expanded in the field of healthcare. In 
the field of justice, the communities are now competent for the enforcement of penalties, 
first line legal assistance and juvenile criminal law. On the other hand, certain aspects of the 
prosecution policy are transferred both to the regions and communities. A large number of 
powers are also transferred from the federal level to the regions, such as important aspects 
of labour market policy and road safety. With regard to tourism, the power of the 
communities is transferred to the regions, notwithstanding a few exceptions.  
Due to these power transfers, a paradigm shift has been realized with regard to the 
distribution of powers, whereby one could argue that most powers are now situated on the 
level of the federated states. The Flemish budget has now indeed become larger than the 
federal budget, if one does not take into account the federal power and budget concerning 
social security.IX  
 
6.2. Copernican revolution? 
The extensive transfer of powers prompted former Prime Minister Di Rupo to call the 
sixth state reform a ‘Copernican revolution’, referring to the renowned statement of former 
Flemish Minister-President Kris Peeters (Pas 2014: 343). An analysis of the power 
transfers, however, reveals that the federal level often maintains influence in areas where 
powers have been transferred to the federated entities. The transfers are characterized by, 
on the one hand, a high level of fragmentation and, on the other hand, cooperation 
obligations and increased mutual dependence (Pas 2014: 353).  
The current fragmentation is at odds with the intended homogenization of powers, 
although the feasibility of such homogenization in a federal state has been questioned 
(Boone 2013: 9, Pas 2014: 350-351). The transfers of powers are very detailed and often 
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include exceptions. The complex, highly technical distribution of powers will inevitably 
lead to conflicts. Moreover, the continuous decentralisation of powers could possibly lead 
to violations of the principles of EU law regarding the internal market and its economic 
freedom of movement (Pas 2014: 357-358). In the past, the Court of Justice of the EU 
already indicated that the distribution of specific powers regarding social security to 
federated entities might be problematic in light of EU law.X  
The sixth state reform also reinforces cooperative federalism in Belgium. In nineteen 
cases, a cooperation agreement must be reached between the federal level and the 
federated states. This policy choice of cooperation agreements is quite remarkable. In 2013, 
the Council of State issued an opinion stating that ten obligatory cooperation agreements, 
which should have been reached before the sixth state reform, had still not entered into 
force.XI Consequently, the Council of State requested the special majority legislator to 
deliberate on the efficacy of this instrument. Nevertheless, the institutional majority 
ignored the advice. Through expanding cooperation obligations between the federated 
entities, Belgium could once again face a joint-decision trap (Pas 2014: 352). 
Thus, the sixth state reform undoubtedly adds additional complexity to the Belgian 
institutional structure and distribution of powers. We believe that it is, therefore, time to 
question the distinction between communities and regions. A new state structure based on 
one type of federated state, organised on territorial lines as federal countries like Germany, 
Switzerland and the U.S., would substantially contribute to a simplification of the 
labyrinthine Belgian state. 
  
7. The future of  Brussels after the sixth state reform 
 
The Brussels-Capital Region acquired many new powers in the sixth state reform. 
Although Flemish politicians repeatedly suggested the combination of a transfer of powers 
and additional financial means for this region with an internal institutional reform, a 
simplification has (again) not been achieved. Brussels remains a tangle of institutions, so 
that a thorough structural reform is still urgent. 
 
7.1. The Brussels Region-Community 
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Former Flemish Minister-President, Kris Peeters, stated on several occasions that 
Brussels would never be a full-fledged region, thereby reflecting the vision of several 
Flemish political parties.XII However, legally, this statement does not make sense. In fact, 
Brussels is a full-fledged region and in the sixth state reform it acquired even more powers 
than the other regions. One could now call Brussels a ‘super-region’ or ‘region-community’ 
(Velaers 2014b: 1023).  
As mentioned above, the person-related powers regarding juvenile criminal law and 
family allowances were transferred to the communities, though in Brussels these passed to 
the Common Community Commission which is composed of members of the Brussels-
Capital regional parliament (Pas 2014: 346). This transfer marked the first time in Belgian 
institutional history that community powers were allocated to the Brussels-Capital Region. 
This transfer of powers is remarkable, as the bilingual character of Brussels and the lack of 
an own autonomous culture are traditionally invoked as arguments against granting 
community powers to Brussels.  
The latter view, which predominated during previous state reforms, has been replaced 
by a more pragmatic manner of thinking. Although Brussels still caused deep discussions 
during the sixth state reform negotiations, the attention has shifted towards defending the 
interests of the region’s inhabitants, rather than to traditional institutional antagonisms 
(Velaers 2014b: 1023). Moreover, the transfer of powers regarding juvenile criminal law 
and family allowances to the Common Community Commission was considered to be a 
constitutional necessity. The existence of different family allowance and juvenile criminal 
law regimes of the French and Flemish Community on the Brussels territory could have led 
to the establishment of sub-nationalities and a differential treatment, which might be 
incompatible with the constitutional principle of equality (Dumont and Van 
Drooghenbroeck 2011).  
 
7.2. Towards a simplification of the Brussels labyrinth? 
During the negotiations on the sixth state reform, a simplification of the labyrinthine 
structure of Brussels institutions was proposed. However, the patchwork of municipal, 
communal and regional institutions has, regrettably, remained intact.  
Brussels has too often been the scene for institutional conflicts and has been the 
subject of many compromises, so that the structure of Brussels became very complex. The 
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current complex structure originates from the different interests of the federal level, the 
Flemish and French Communities, the Brussels-Capital Region and the European Union, 
which each influences Brussels politics. One cannot ignore the special position of Brussels 
in Belgian federalism as capital of the country, which brings about specific challenges 
(Velaers 2014b: 985). In addition, 28% of the population in Brussels does not have the 
Belgian nationality, which gives rise to challenges with regard to multiculturalism. Brussels 
is also de facto the capital of the EU and has a strong international character, causing the 
need for a customized approach.  
In conclusion, a simplification of the existing patchwork of Brussels institutions is 
urgent (Velaers 2014b: 1024). As Brussels faces many socioeconomic challenges due to its 
status of bilingual and multicultural capital, it is questionable whether it is possible to deal 
with these challenges without providing a solid solution for the institutional problems. In 
this regard, it could be necessary for the communities to decrease their influence in 
Brussels in order to enable a simplification of the institutions and the distribution of 
powers. 
 
7.3. ‘Frenchification’ of Brussels 
Due to the Frenchification starting at the end of the 18th century, there is in practice 
no real bilingualism in Brussels. In the legal sense the Belgian capital is bilingual, but 
French has gradually taken the upper hand. Consequently, as part of the deal on the reform 
of the Brussels judicial district, the Butterfly Agreement, for instance, stipulated that the public 
prosecutor of the Brussels Public Prosecution Service needed to be French-speaking. 
However, the Constitutional Court recently annulled this provision.XIII Nevertheless, the 
annulled provision is a clear indicator of the mind-set resulting from the substantial 
Frenchification, which is strikingly illustrated by the final report of the Taskforce Brussels 
in 2012.XIV The number of Brussels inhabitants whose spoken French is classed as ‘well’ to 
‘excellent’, remains stable at 95.5%. In contrast, the Dutch-speaking group is limited to 
28.2%. Moreover, only 17.2% of the French-speaking Brussels inhabitants speak Dutch to 
their Dutch-speaking friends.  
The gap between legal bilingualism and the actual dominance of French is substantial. 
In fact, the fear of some Flemish inhabitants of Brussels that the influence of the Flemish 
Community and the use of Dutch will diminish, is justified. The reason why Brussels is still 
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officially bilingual only has historical and political reasons: for centuries, Brussels used to 
be a Dutch-speaking town and the city still remains the capital of the Flemish Community.  
The question rises whether the Flemish-speaking inhabitants of Brussels believe that 
the ties with the Flemish Community are still desirable and necessary, because Brussels’ 
citizens seem to be increasingly convinced that they form a group which should govern 
Brussels without interference from the French and Flemish Communities. Cutting the ties 
between Brussels and the communities thus gradually seems to be entering the Brussels 
mind-set (Vuye 2012: 246-247). In order to fulfil the increased desire for self-governance in 
Brussels, a new state structure has been advocated in legal doctrine (Vande Lanotte 2011).  
In conclusion, the initial intentions of the sixth state reform regarding a simplification 
of the Brussels patchwork were laudable, but the execution should have been better and 
more transparent. Therefore, Brussels will also in the future remain the constitutional 
laboratory of Belgium. 
  
8. The future of  Belgian federalism 
 
It should be apparent to the reader by now that Belgium has not yet reached the final 
stage of its institutional evolution. The implementation of the sixth state reform may 
therefore be seen as the first step towards the seventh reform of Belgian federalism. The 
strong Flemish nationalistic movement, the desire for self-governance in Brussels, and the 
inefficiency of the current federal structure will in all likelihood eventually lead to a seventh 
state reform with new power transfers to the federated entities (Velaers 2013: 571). 
However, it is doubtful whether this new state reform will be realised in the next few years. 
A recent survey (2014) shows a decline of 15.6% in the desire of Flemish voters to grant 
more powers to the federated entities, in comparison to the situation before the sixth state 
reform. The survey shows that currently the majority of Flemings (57.5%) are in favour of 
either the current state structure (32.8%) or more powers to the federal level (13.2%) or 
even a unitary state (11.2%). The same survey also indicates that employment (43%), 
healthcare (36.9%) and pensions (32.4%) were regarded to be the crucial themes for the 
voters in the 2014 federal elections. Hence, the main focus of the election was not inspired 
by the need for institutional reform.  
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The power transfers of the sixth state reform have resulted in a paradigm shift, since 
the lion’s share of powers – excluding social security – is now situated at the level of the 
federated states. The sixth state reform also thoroughly revised the Special Finance Act, 
which considerably increased the fiscal autonomy of the regions. Nevertheless, large fixed 
dotations are still allocated to the communities and regions. Undoubtedly, calls for further 
raising the level of fiscal autonomy and accountability of the federated entities will be put 
on the table in the future. 
 
8.1. Towards a Belgian Union with three or four states? 
The transfer of powers in the sixth state reform resulted in a blurred distinction 
between the powers of the communities and regions. For the first time, the Brussels 
Common Community Commission has been granted ‘person-related’ powers which are 
traditionally allocated to the communities. This blurred boundary between regions and 
communities could be the stepping stone to create a new state structure, based on one type 
of federated entity. Such a transformation might also raise the question of the possibility of 
‘recentralisation’ of powers in certain areas, as the previous state reforms have led to 
considerable fragmentation of powers. There are no real constitutional taboos in this 
regard. According to Verdussen (2013: 575), the constitutional framework could be 
thoroughly rethought, possibly leading to the abolition of the distinction between 
communities and regions. 
Renowned Belgian politician and professor of constitutional law, Johan Vande Lanotte, 
among others, defends this vision for the future (Vande Lanotte 2011). According to 
Vande Lanotte, Belgium should become a Union of four federated states, namely Flanders, 
Wallonia, Brussels and the German-speaking region. Professor Stefan Sottiaux also 
suggests the creation of the ‘United States of Belgium’ (Sottiaux 2011). Such an 
institutional system would be transparent and would enable the federated states to adopt 
different policies to adequately tackle their own specific problems. For instance, Brussels 
has typical metropolitan problems, such as migration, transport and employment for poorly 
educated workers. Challenges requiring a collaborative approach with other states could be 
dealt with through cooperation agreements. Article 1 of the Constitution, which proclaims 
that Belgium is a federal state consisting of regions and communities, should be altered to 
reform the Belgian state in the way suggested by Vande Lanotte and Sottiaux. Moreover, 
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we believe that it would be advisable to submit such a significant constitutional reform to 
the voters for the sake of democratic legitimacy. 
Nevertheless, critics of this vision of a Belgian Union with federated states have argued 
that Brussels would not be able to function without the funding of the other states (Vuye 
2012: 252). This is far from being true, as Brussels has a lot of corporation seats. Thus, a 
decentralisation of corporate taxation would immediately solve the financial problems of 
Brussels. Moreover, the proximity of Brussels Airport is a huge motor for both local 
economy and employment.  
According to Hendrik Vuye, N-VA fraction leader in the Chamber of Representatives, 
and constitutional expert, the key word for the further evolution of Brussels – and Belgium 
in general – is ‘asymmetry’ (Vuye 2012: 259). According to Vuye, the Walloon and Flemish 
visions of Brussels do not have to be the same. On the contrary, it will only be when the 
two communities can constitutionally realize their different visions that Brussels will be 
able to flourish. In Vuye’s vision, Flanders can maintain its institutional connection to 
Brussels, whilst the French-speakers can develop the French Community Commission 
(COCOF) into a full-fledged community.  
 
8.2. Towards a crucial role for the reformed Senate or its abolition? 
The reformed Senate could play a crucial role in a seventh reform of the Belgian state. 
As described above, the Senate is now a full-fledged chamber of the federated entities, 
mainly competent for institutional matters. We believe that the senators should be 
proactive in preparing for future steps in the institutional reform of Belgium by gathering 
information through expert hearings and debates. The Senate should thus act similarly to 
the Convention on the Future of Europe, which drafted the notorious EU Constitutional 
Treaty. It is clear that the current legislative term will be decisive for the role and the future 
existence of the Senate. If the chamber does not act as a useful platform of (institutional) 
communication between the regions and communities, it would be better that the Senate 
be dissolved, and that its function should be integrated within the Chamber of 
Representatives. 
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